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Abstract
We study a simple epistemic logic with a re-
stricted language where formulas are boolean com-
binations of (epistemic) atoms: sequences of ‘know-
ing whether’ operators followed by propositional
variables. Our language is strictly more expressive
than existing restricted languages, where atoms are
sequences of epistemic operators and negations fol-
lowed by propositional variables (in other words:
atoms are epistemic formulas without conjunctions
and disjunctions). Going further beyond existing ap-
proaches, we also introduce a ‘common knowledge of
a group whether’ operator. We give an axiomatiza-
tion for this logic and show that the model checking
and satisfiability problems can be reduced to their
classical counterparts.
1 Introduction
Suppose there are n agents, each of which knows
some secret: a piece of information that is not
known to the others. They communicate by phone
calls, and whenever one person calls another they
tell each other all they know at that time. How
many calls are required before each item of gossip
is known to everyone? This is known as the gossip
problem. It is of great interest in the conception of
communication networks [15] and in parallel and
distributed computing, but there are other less ob-
vious applications like the management of data
on storage devices [20], or the computation of the
syntenic distance between two genomes (minimum
number of fusions, fissions, and translocations re-
quired to transform one into the other) [24]. Sev-
eral variants have been studied in the literature,
and a survey of these alternatives and the associ-
ated results has been published [15]. The gossip
problem can be viewed as a multiagent epistemic
planning task where the goal is shared knowledge:
everybody knows all secrets. It is a purely epis-
temic planning task because it is only the agents’
knowledge that evolves, while the facts of the world
remain unchanged. There are numerous varia-
tions of such a planning problem; see e.g. [10] for
an overview. The goal may in particular be to
achieve higher-order shared knowledge: everybody
knows that everybody knows all secrets, and so on.
Due to its simplicity and its variations, the gos-
sip problem can be viewed as a paradigmatic epis-
temic planning task, much in the same way as the
blocksworld is a paradigmatic classical planning
task.
The aim of the present paper is to follow up on
[8], in which we introduce a simple logical approach
within which we can account for epistemic plan-
ning tasks such as the above. We could have chosen
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) for that purpose:
its event models allow us to model telephone calls
as private announcements. However, we take in-
spiration from a simpler framework: the Dynamic
Epistemic Logic of Propositional Assignment and
Observation (DEL-PAO), introduced in [16] and fur-
ther developed in [6, 17, 25]. It is based on visi-
bility atoms, that are recursively defined as either
propositional variables or atomic pieces of informa-
tion about whether or not an agent sees the truth
value of a visibility atom. DEL-PAO was applied to
epistemic planning in [9]. We here concentrate on
the epistemic logic underlying DEL-PAO, disregard-
ing the dynamic aspects. The logic is consequently
called the Epistemic Logic of Observation, abbre-
viated to EL-O. We improve in [8] over [9] by inte-
grating a form of common knowledge into planning,
and polynomially embed the EL-O-based planning
we define into classical planning. It follows that
deciding the solvability of a simple epistemic plan-
ning task is PSPACE complete.
However, the form of common knowledge we
have in [8] only accounts for knowledge shared by
all of the agents. In particular, in the gossip prob-
lem, we cannot model the common knowledge be-
tween only two agents that we would expect to oc-
cur after a phone call between those agents. In
many situations we can imagine knowledge becom-
ing common within a subgroup of agents, such as
agents in a call or agents present in a room (while
some other agents may be outside of that room).
In this paper we therefore study a generalization
of EL-O which accounts for joint vision within sub-
groups of agents.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we provide a detailed motivation of our approach.
In Section 3 we introduce our generalization of EL-
O. In Section 4 we study its properties. We conclude
in Section 5.
2 Background and motivation
Reasoning in epistemic logic as introduced by
Hintikka [18] and popularized in AI by Halpern
and colleagues [12] is strictly more complex than
in classical logic: the satisfiability problem is at
least in PSPACE, and is EXPTIME-complete if com-
mon knowledge is involved [14]. The complexity
gap widens for planning tasks: while the solvabil-
ity problem is PSPACE complete for classical plan-
ning [5], it is undecidable for planning in DEL [3].
Such DEL-based accounts of epistemic planning
provide rather expressive models for the agents’
perception of actions. These models parallel the
standard epistemic logic modelling of uncertainty
in terms of indistinguishability relations between
possible states: uncertainty in the perception of ac-
tions is modelled by so-called event models in terms
of indistinguishability relations between possible
events. As explored in a series of papers, unde-
cidability is already the case under very weak hy-
potheses about these event models [1, 4, 7]. Basi-
cally, DEL planning tasks are only decidable when
the event model is a singleton, i.e., when all actions
are public. However, actions in the gossip problem
as well as in many real world applications are not
public.
We propose in [8] to base epistemic planning
on an epistemic logic that is simpler than Hin-
tikka’s. Basically, what we do is restrict epistemic
information to atomic formulas. We are not the
first to do this: several previous approaches have
proposed languages where the scope of the epis-
temic operator Ki is restricted to literals, or liter-
als that are preceded by a sequence of epistemic
operators [11, 28, 21], possibly with negations [27].
Such restrictions however exclude formulas such as
Ki(K jp ∨ K j¬p) expressing that agent i knows that
agent j knows whether the propositional variable
p is true. This is a major drawback because such
formulas are fundamental in communication and
more generally in any forms of interaction: a situ-
ation where agent i does not know whether p is the
case or not (¬Kip ∧ ¬Ki¬p) but knows that j knows
(Ki(K jp ∨ K j¬p)) may lead agent i to ask j about p.
For example, in the modelling of the gossip prob-
lem ‘knowing-whether’ information is required to
describe the initial situation∧
i
(
(Kisi ∨ Ki¬si) ∧∧ j,i(¬Kis j ∧ ¬Ki¬s j))
where si is the secret of agent i, as well as the goal∧
i, j
(
Kis j ∨ Ki¬s j).
We here make a similar restriction, but move
from the primitive ‘knowing-that’ operator Ki to the
less standard ‘knowing-whether’ or ‘knowing-if ’ op-
erator Kifi, also considered in [26]. In the unre-
stricted language these two operators are interde-
finable: we have Kifiϕ ↔ Kiϕ ∨ Ki¬ϕ and Kiϕ ↔
ϕ∧Kifiϕ, for arbitrary formulas ϕ [13]. However, the
situation changes when we restrict the language to
sequences of ‘knowing-whether’ operators followed
by propositional variables: we can not only define
Kip as p∧Kifip and Ki¬p as ¬p∧Kifip, but we can also
express formulas such as the above Ki(K jp ∨ K j¬p),
namely by Kif jp ∧ KifiKif jp.
We present in [8] the logic EL-O, where Kifi is
written as Si. We read Si p as “agent i sees whether
p is true or not”. When we define Kip as p ∧ Si p we
therefore consider that i’s knowledge comes from
what i sees. Such a primitive was introduced in
the model checking literature in order to repre-
sent epistemic models in a compact way [29, 19, 2].
All these approaches were based on the hypothe-
sis that who sees what is common knowledge. This
is a very strong hypothesis: it follows that when-
ever i knows that p is true then i knows exactly
who else knows that p is true. In terms of the vis-
ibility operator, these papers consider Si S j p to be
valid for arbitrary i and j. As first proposed in [16],
this restriction can be overcome by abandoning the
validity of Si S j p and giving the status of first-class
citizens to such sequences.
Formally, in EL-O, it is considered that every vis-
ibility atom Si1 . . . Sin p is an atomic formula. Com-
plex formulas are then boolean combinations of
such atomic formulas. The reader should keep in
mind that Si is not a modal operator, in opposi-
tion to Kifi (and our move in notation also aims
at stressing that). This comes with a move away
from Kripke models with accessibility relations: a
model is simply a valuation over the set of visibil-
ity atoms, alias a state. We identify such valua-
tions with sets of visibility atoms. As argued in
[29, 2], such compact models are more attractive
than Kripke models when it comes to model check-
ing.
Simplifications of epistemic logic typically lack a
modal operator of common knowledge. In [8] we in-
troduce the operator JS , reading JS p as “all agents
jointly see the value of p”, or “all agents jointly see
whether p is true or not”. Metaphorically, joint at-
tention about a propositional variable p can be un-
derstood as eye contact between the agents when
observing p. JS is a powerful operator that rep-
resents common knowledge obtained through co-
presence. To understand the power of JS, one may
think of JS p as implying the infinite set of propo-
sitions of the form Si1 . . . Sin p for all i1, . . . , in and all
n ≥ 1. Suppose p stands for ‘the door is open’. We
can imagine that JS p is true when all agents are
present in the same room and not only observe the
door, but also mutually observe each other. In this
concrete example, if an agent leaves the room and
closes the door behind her, JS p becomes false be-
cause the agents no longer mutually observe each
other (even if the agent who has left can see the
closed door from the outside). As joint visibility of
p should imply individual visibility of p, we require
that states containing JS p should also contain ev-
ery Si p, and more generally every p preceded by
any sequence of Si and JS. Defining CKp as p ∧ JS p,
we obtain a common knowledge operator that sat-
isfies all the standard properties except the induc-
tion axiom CK(p → ∧i∈Agt Kip) → (p → CKp); actu-
ally the antecedent cannot be directly expressed by
means of JS operators.
This ‘joint vision’ operator still has expressive
limits. In particular, it does not account for joint vi-
sion between groups of agents, when those groups
are strictly smaller than the set of all agent. We
therefore generalize the notion of joint vision to
‘joint vision within a group’, and introduce the cor-
responding operator JSG , where G is a group of
agents. The operators JS and Si can be expressed
as JSAgt and JS{i} respectively. We can now express by
JS{1,2} p the fact that agents 1 and 2 jointly see p, for
example after 1 has called 2 to share information
about p, excluding 3 from the conversation.
It is generally considered in the AI literature
that a reasonable epistemic logic should satisfy in-
trospection: the formulas Kiϕ → KiKiϕ and ¬Kiϕ →
Ki¬Kiϕ should both be valid. 1 In terms of visi-
bility this means that states should contain every
JSG′ JSG p forG′ ⊆ G, and more generally JSG′ JSG p pre-
ceded by any sequence JSH . . . JSH′ .
In the rest of the paper we will work out the de-
tails of what we have sketched up to now.
3 EL-O: Epistemic Logic of Observa-
tion
We introduce our generalization of the Epistemic
Logic of Observation, abbreviated to EL-O.
3.1 Atoms, introspective atoms, and atomic
consequence
Let Prop be a countable set of propositional vari-
ables and let Agt be a finite set of agents. We call
finite set of agents groups, and denote them by G,
H, etc.
We use σ,σ′, etc. to denote elements of
(
2Agt
)∗, i.e.,
words on the set of groups. The set of non-empty
words built from elements of G is
(
2G
)+.
An atom is a word of groups followed by a propo-
sitional variable. We use α, α′, etc. to denote ele-
ments of the set of atoms ATM =
(
2Agt
)∗ × Prop. We
treat atoms as words, too, allowing the notation σα
for atoms, and identify in atoms any group G with
the operator JSG ; for example, we write JSG1 JSG2 p
instead of the couple 〈G1G2, p〉. We read JSG α as
“group G jointly sees α”. Atoms with an empty
sequence of groups are nothing but propositional
variables.
Here are some examples: JS{1} p reads “1 sees the
value of p”. It means that 1 knows whether p is
true or false. JS{1,3} JS{2} q reads “1 and 3 jointly see
whether agent 2 sees the value of q”. In other
words, there is joint attention between 1 and 3 con-
cerning 2’s observation of q: agent 2 may or may not
see the value of q, and in both cases this is jointly
observed.
We are going to design the semantics in such a
way that principles of introspection are valid. An
atom is introspective if it is of the form σJSH JSG α
with H ⊆ G. We call I-ATM the set of all introspec-
tive atoms.
1. We are aware that negative introspection was criticised
in the literature as being too strong [22, 23]. One may how-
ever argue that these criticisms do not apply to visibility-based
knowledge.
Atomic consequence is a relation on ATM that is
defined inductively by:
p⇒ β iff p = β
JSG α⇒ β iff β = σα and σ ∈ (2G)+
For example, JS{1,2,3} p ⇒ JS{3} JS{1,2} p. The relation
⇒ is clearly reflexive and transitive. When α ⇒ β,
we say that α is a cause of β and that β is a conse-
quence of α. We will, of course, ensure that atomic
consequences are valid implications.
The set of atomic consequences of an atom α is
α⇒ = {β : α ⇒ β}. The set of atomic causes of an
atom α is α⇐ = {β : β⇒ α}. The set of consequences
of an atom other than a propositional variables is
infinite. The set of causes of an atom α is finite and
if we define the length of a visibility operator JSG to
be one, then each cause is no longer than α.
We generalise the definition of atomic conse-
quence to sets of atoms s ⊆ ATM in the obvious way:
s⇒ =
⋃
α∈s α⇒.
3.2 Language
The language of EL-O is defined by the following
grammar:
ϕ ::= α | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ)
where α ranges over ATM. The set of EL-O formulas
is noted FmlEL-O.
The boolean operators >, ⊥, ∨, → and ↔ are de-
fined in the standard way. The set ATM(ϕ) of atoms
of formula ϕ is defined by:
ATM(α) = {α}
ATM(¬ϕ) = ATM(ϕ)
ATM(ϕ ∧ ϕ′) = ATM(ϕ) ∪ ATM(ϕ′)
For example, ATM(JS{1,3} q ∧ JS{2} p) = {JS{1,3} q, JS{2} p}
and ATM(JS{1} JS{2,3} p) = {JS{1} JS{2,3} p}. Note that nei-
ther p nor JS{2,3} p are atoms of JS{1} JS{2,3} p.
3.3 Interpretation of formulas
A state is a subset of the set of atoms ATM. We
denote states by s, s′, etc. The set of all states is
2ATM.
An obvious way of guaranteeing introspection is
to interpret formulas exclusively in introspectively
closed states: states that contain all introspective
atoms and are closed under ⇒, i.e., sets of atoms
that equal s⇒ ∪ I-ATM for some state s ⊆ ATM. This
is what was done in [16]. The drawback of such a
semantics is that introspective states are infinite,
s |= α iff α ∈ s⇒ ∪ I-ATM
s |= ¬ϕ iff not (s |= ϕ)
s |= ϕ ∧ ϕ′ iff s |= ϕ and s |= ϕ′
Table 1 – Interpretation of formulas
while model checking requires a finite state. This
problem can be overcome by defining states that
are ‘sufficiently introspective’, as done in [25]. We
here take an easier road by directly working with
finite models, interpreting formulas in such a way
that introspection is simulated.
The truth conditions for EL-O formulas are given
in Table 1. The non-standard one is the one for
atoms α: α is true in state s if and only if α is intro-
spective or β⇒ α for some β ∈ s.
Example 1. In the initial state of the gossip prob-
lem every agent only knows her own secret. For
the sake of simplicity we moreover suppose that all
secrets are initially true. Therefore s0 = {JS{i} si :
i ∈ Agt} ∪ {si : i ∈ Agt}. Then s0 |= JS{i} si and
s0 |=
∧
j,i ¬JS{i} s j for every i ∈ Agt.
When s |= ϕ for every s ⊆ ATM then we say that ϕ
is valid; when s |= ϕ for some s ⊆ ATM then we say
that ϕ is satisfiable.
Proposition 1. For every α ⊆ ATM, α is valid iff α
is introspective.
Proof. For the left-to-right direction, suppose α is
valid. Then in particular ∅ |= α. As ∅⇒ is still empty,
α must be introspective.
If α ⇒ β then α → β is EL-O valid. The converse
is not always the case. However:
Proposition 2. α → β is EL-O valid iff β is intro-
spective or α⇒ β.
Proof. The right-to-left direction is obvious. For the
left-to-right direction, suppose α→ β is EL-O valid.
Then in particular {α} |= β. Hence β is either an
introspective atom or an atomic consequence of α.
4 Properties
We now reduce EL-O to Classical Propositional
Calculus, then give an axiomatization for it.
4.1 Relation with Classical Propositional
Calculus
In our framework there are two options when it
comes to defining Classical Propositional Calculus
(CPC). The first is to restrict the language to for-
mulas without operators of visibility; classical logic
is then the set of validities of that language. The
second option is more interesting here: we consider
the full language built from ATM, but we modify the
interpretation of visibility atoms to
s |=CPC α iff α ∈ s
and keep the same interpretation as in EL-O oth-
erwise. Hence we have visibility atoms but do not
care about introspection; for example, the formulas
¬JS{i} JS{i} p and JS{i, j} p ∧ ¬JS{i} p are classically satisfi-
able: for the former, ∅ |=CPC ¬JS{i} JS{i} p; for the latter,
{JS{i, j} p} |=CPC ¬JS{i} p.
In the rest of the section we provide two embed-
dings from EL-O into CPC: one where we expand
states, and one where we expand formulas.
Proposition 3. For every state s ⊆ ATM and for-
mula ϕ ∈ FmlEL-O, s |= ϕ if and only if s⇒ ∪
I-ATM |=CPC ϕ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the form of ϕ.
The base case is immediate from the interpretation
of atoms in EL-O.
The above proposition confirms that we simulate
introspectively closed states with our interpreta-
tion of formulas. It also entails the following prop-
erties:
Lemma 1. For all states s, s′ ⊆ ATM and for every
formula ϕ ∈ FmlEL-O, if s and s′ classically agree on
atoms of ϕ then they classically agree on ϕ. That is,
if s∩ATM(ϕ) = s′∩ATM(ϕ) then s |=CPC ϕ iff s′ |=CPC ϕ.
Proposition 4. For every state s ⊆ ATM and for-
mula ϕ ∈ FmlEL-O, s |= ϕ if and only if (s⇒ ∪ I-ATM) ∩
ATM(ϕ) |=CPC ϕ.
Corollary 1. For every state s ⊆ ATM and formula
ϕ ∈ FmlEL-O, s |= ϕ if and only if (s⇒ ∪ I-ATM) ∩
ATM(ϕ) |= ϕ.
Proof. This stems from the fact that if sϕ = (s⇒ ∪
I-ATM) ∩ ATM(ϕ), then (sϕ)ϕ = sϕ. Therefore sϕ |= ϕ
iff sϕ |=CPC ϕ.
As ATM(ϕ) is finite, we hence have the finite
model property both in EL-O and in the classical
translation. In particular, the model checking prob-
lem and the satisfiability problem have the same
complexities as in CPC.
The second embedding is more interesting from
a planning point of view, as it does not modify the
states. We define the expansion of an atom as fol-
lows:
Exp(α) =
> if α ∈ I-ATM(∨α⇐) otherwise
We extend this definition homomorphically to for-
mulas. For example, if Agt = {i, j}, the expan-
sion of the EL-O unsatisfiable JS{i, j} p ∧ ¬JS{i} p is
JS{i, j} p ∧ ¬(JS{i} p ∨ JS{i, j} p), which is classically un-
satisfiable; and the expansion of the EL-O satisfi-
able JS{i, j} JS{i} p ∧ ¬JS{i} p is the classically satisfiable
(JS{i, j} JS{i} p ∨ JS{i, j} p) ∧ ¬(JS{i} p ∨ JS{i, j} p). This can be
generalised:
Proposition 5. For every state s ⊆ ATM and for-
mula ϕ ∈ FmlEL-O, s |= ϕ iff s |=CPC Exp(ϕ).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the form of
ϕ. For the base case we distinguish two subcases.
First, if α ∈ I-ATM then Exp(α) = > and therefore
s |= α and s |=CPC Exp(α). Second, if α < I-ATM then
s |= α iff β ⇒ α for some β ∈ s. The latter is equiva-
lent to s |=CPC ∨α⇐.
In the version of EL-O with only the JS and Si op-
erators, the expansion was polynomial and allowed
us to go from epistemic to classical planning with
no increase in complexity. However, in this more
general case, this expansion causes an explosion of
the length of the formula, as the number of causes
of an atom JSG α is exponential in the size of G. We
will come back to this issue in the conclusion.
4.2 Axiomatization
The valid EL-O formulas are axiomatized by the
schemas of Table 2.
Proposition 6. For every formula ϕ ∈ FmlEL-O, ϕ is
EL-O valid iff ϕ is provable in CPC from the four
axiom schemas Vis1– Vis4 of Table 2.
Proof. We take advantage of Proposition 3 and
show that the schemas Vis1–Vis4 characterise the
set of introspectively closed states {s⇒∪ I-ATM : s ⊆
ATM}.
The right-to-left direction is clear: each of the
four axiom schemas is valid in introspectively
closed states.
For the left-to-right direction, we show that every
s satisfying Vis1–Vis4 is introspectively closed. We
begin with closure under atomic consequence. Let
s |= α. The interesting case is when α = JSG α′. Then
s |= JSG JSH1 α′ for any H1 ⊆ G by axiom (Vis4), and
JSH JSG α for H ⊆ G (Vis1)
JSAgt JSH JSG α for H ⊆ G (Vis2)
JSG α→ JSH α for H ⊆ G (Vis3)
JSG α→ JSG JSH α for H ⊆ G (Vis4)
Table 2 – Axioms for introspection
also s |= JSG JSH2 JSH1 α′ for any H1,H2 ⊆ G, and so on:
we can generate any s |= JSG σα′ for any σ ∈ (2G)∗
and then, by (Vis3), we can obtain s |= JSH σα′ for any
H ⊆ G and any σ ∈ (2G)∗. We can therefore obtain
that s satisfies any sequence whose strict postfix is
α′, that is, every σα′ for any σ ∈ (2G)+.
We use the same technique to show that a state s
satisfying Vis1–Vis4 satisfies every σ JSH JSG α for σ ∈(
22
Agt )∗ and H ⊆ G, using (Vis1) if σ is empty, and
(Vis2), (Vis4) and (Vis3) otherwise.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have generalized the logic EL-O,
subsuming its observability operators by an opera-
tor of joint vision within an arbitrary group. We
have defined and axiomatized the corresponding
logic, and shown that it can be reduced to classi-
cal propositional logic.
Based on the visibility information that is con-
tained in the states, an accessibility relation can be
defined for every group of agents to in order to in-
terpret a common knowledge operator CKG, which
becomes the standard knowledge operator Ki when
G = {i} and the common knowledge operator CK
when G = Agt. The properties of the latter and
the relation with standard epistemic logic are dis-
cussed in [8] and can be extended to this general-
ized definition. In particular, CKGα is equivalent to
α ∧ JSG α.
We give in [8] a definition of planning in EL-O
as well as a reduction to classical planning. The
decidability of EL-O-based epistemic planning con-
trasts with the undecidability of DEL-based epis-
temic planning, which is the case even for simple
fragments.
It is proved in [8] that the complexity of solvabil-
ity in EL-O-based planning is PSPACE complete.
The proof relies on the fact that the length and
number of causes of a given atom are not greater
than the length of that atom, resulting in polyno-
mial translations to CPC and classical planning. In
the more general setting where joint vision within
arbitrary groups is allowed, the number of causes
of an atom becomes exponential, and the property
no longer holds. We can however retain this low
complexity while keeping our framework relevant
for a number of applications by allowing joint vi-
sion only for relevant groups. For example, in the
gossip problem, we only need joint vision between
pairs of agents. Similarly, it is natural to imagine
that there may be a limit on the number of agents
that can be present in a room at the same time, or
that can join in on a conversation.
We have as of now only presented the general-
ization of EL-O. The next step is of course to ex-
tend this generalization to epistemic planning, and
further refine the limits in complexity mentioned
above. More generally, it will be interesting to
study how our epistemic actions compare to DEL
event models.
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